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Close looking and conviction 
 
 
Introduction 
It is often said in art history that ‘close looking’ - close, descriptive, attention to 
‘the object’ – should have a privileged status. In the words of a recent Art Bulletin 
contributor: ‘I never feel more like an art historian than when, after a student has 
done her share of exhaustive research, has tried to interpret an artwork in light 
of all the readings I have assigned, I ask her to set that aside. “Just look,” I say. I 
ask her to base her observations on the way the artwork resists the context we 
can mobilize around it. Given what we know, what is different here from what 
we might expect?’1 
This sort of thinking has always had a special purchase in writing on 
modernism, where from Roger Fry through to Rosalind Krauss a critical tradition 
committed to close inspection of its objects, often called formalist or neo-
formalist, has attempted to propose a method that minimises or cuts out entirely 
the appeal to external, contextual, or associative factors. According to one 
supporter of this tradition, Charles Harrison, the best justification for close 
attention to artworks is that certain objects of ‘exceptional and intentional care’ 
‘have a greater capacity than others to arbitrate what is and is not a valid 
description’.2 As such ‘it is this capacity in the work to arbitrate its own 
description that the artist deserving of the name tests for in the self-critical 
procedures of the practice’.3 ‘Harrison’, a sympathetic commentator notes, 
‘claims that there is one point forcefully made by the writers of modernist 
criticism that deserves reiteration. That is that works of art are not necessarily 
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interpretable by reference to social or historical events; they are events 
requiring interpretation in their own right’.4 
In the four sections of this paper I offer theoretical and practical 
reflections on the operations involved in art historical close looking; a corollary 
of this account being scepticism about taking claims like Harrison’s too literally.5 
First I suggest that however close the inspection of a picture, a context of origin 
or reception must be used in order to disambiguate it. Second, that the standard 
and most secure form of disambiguation is not just an appeal to context of origin, 
but more narrowly to an attenuated form of intention. Thirdly, that description 
based on ‘close looking’ tends to operate via ‘redescription’ of picked out 
qualities according to a particular context or set of contexts (and in the case of 
much modernist criticism, that rather than a rejection of context, the writer’s 
view of modernism itself functions as such a context). Finally I close with brief 
reflections on the way that a governing context, such as modernism, is used to 
attribute a generalised form of agency to those artists to which it is applied. 
In relation to writing on modernism, one notion that emerges is this: that 
this kind of writing might be understood as projecting onto a set of artists a 
universalized underlying intention to ‘be modernist’, then relativizing the 
interpretation of their works to a context based on the unfolding stylistic or 
ideological development that the particular critic thinks is at work in modernism 
at its best. (This is not to deny that many writers on modernism are fully aware 
that ‘minimising context’ in the name of close looking really means a shift of the 
contextual burden on to their views of modernism and its art history. Merely to 
say that the subtleties of that position have often been lost on readers, 
explicators, and followers.)  
 3 
More generally, interpretations based on ‘just looking’ (or on ‘form’, or 
‘structure’, or the ‘signifier’), emerge as in practice yielding not exactly a closer 
relation to the ‘object’, but a kind of allegory structured by whatever context is, 
however implicitly, brought to bear. Modernist criticism would then be one 
special form of this allegorisation, albeit an especially successful, influential, and 
according to some accounts defensible, one. 
 
1. Ambiguity and indiscernibility 
It is a familiar notion that pictures are deeply ambiguous. Art historical examples 
range from simple decisions about representational matters much debated in the 
literature – is the item closest to us on the table in Parmigianino’s Portrait of a 
Collector a rat or an antique statue; are there faces hidden in Dürer’s sketches of 
pillows? (Fig. 1) – to those ‘monstrously ambiguous’ works such as Giorgione’s 
Tempesta or Velasquez’s Las Meninas, where ever-proliferating scholarship leads 
to ever-less hope of agreement about what exactly is going on.6  
The issue can be presented in radicalised manner through the idea of 
indiscernibles – of initially perceptually identical objects that when linked to 
different contexts yield dramatically different sets of properties. Take the word 
for word recreation of sections of Don Quixote carried out by Pierre Menard in 
the early twentieth century.7 In Borges’ short story he is able to quote identical 
passages from the ‘two’ works and enumerate the striking differences between 
the earlier and later: the ‘crude’ becomes ‘subtle’; the ‘natural’ becomes ‘archaic’ 
and ‘affected’; the ‘merely rhetorical’ becomes ‘brazenly pragmatic’.8 At one point 
it is said that ‘The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but 
the second is almost infinitely richer’.9 Inspired in part by this fable, Arthur 
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Danto’s imaginary exhibition of seven identical looking painted and framed red 
rectangles has presented the pictorial equivalent most succinctly. Knowing that 
one of these is a painting of ‘Israelites Crossing the Red Sea’, that one is of 
‘Kierkegaard’s Mood’, one is a canvas primed by Giorgione on which a Sacra 
Conversazione was planned, and so on, leads to the realisation that each of these 
initially indiscernible red squares has entirely different sets of properties, 
representing and expressing different things, or being something we may not 
acknowledge as a work of art at all.10 
Leaving aside Danto’s grander claims about the ontology of art, one lesson 
that has been drawn from this thought experiment is that fixing what a particular 
work of art is taken to be is a highly context-specific matter – a case of a text or 
sound structure or physical object being indicated in a particular context.11 
Determination of the features of a work of art, including what it represents, 
expresses, means, and so forth, standardly depends on an idea about the origin of 
that work.12 This determining origin can be roughly described as a ‘context of 
origin’, indicating a need for the information that the work was made by a 
particular person (or persons) at a particular time in a particular artistic context. 
More controversially, though undoubtedly often the case in practice, 
determination of the work can also depend on a ‘context of reception’, such as 
the particular gaze directed towards it or perspective from which it is looked 
at.13 Either way, determination of such a context is the only way that ambiguity 
can be resolved. And because indiscernibles show that such ambiguity does not 
have to be directly visually apparent, this means that works can in theory always 
be redescribed given the bringing to bear of a new construction of context of 
origin or reception.14  
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This adds up to what we know is the case from experience – that the 
works best able to arbitrate their own description are simply the ones about 
which we have the firmest agreement on the kinds of intention and context that 
fix their identity. The Tempesta has often been held up as a prime example of an 
inherently ambiguous paining.15 But a key reason it is so ambiguous is that we 
have so have little information about the place and time and context of the 
painting’s creation, including Giorgione’s intentions, those of the patrons, and 
those of contemporary scholarly or lay audiences. Later but eminently non-
modernist paintings like Luke Fildes’ much-abused The Doctor (Fig. 2) are in fact 
far better able to arbitrate their own description. But rather than a question of 
exceptional and intentional care, or the quality of pictorial thought, the reason 
such a work does not yield deep ambiguity is that we are pretty sure that we 
know how Fildes and all significant contemporary audiences would have seen 
the work. Some of the most revered modernist works now edge close to the 
category of ‘monstrous ambiguity’, whereby the literature is so large that a 
whole term of a university course devoted to just one such work would be 
insufficient to cover it.16 The Doctor, on the other hand, is so ‘stable’ as a work 
that in art critical and historical articles it is only mentioned as an easy example 
rather than analysed as a problem, as if everything about it is eminently plain to 
see. It is more likely to be dealt with at length in medical journals than art 
historical journals, and there talked about as an emblem for the profession, or as 
evidence for historical medical practices.17 
At this point it may be obvious to art historians familiar with critiques of 
‘context’ that disambiguation via context of origin or reception means there are 
both horizontal and vertical paths to potentially unmanageable indeterminacy.18 
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In the first case the kind of information that may be included in the construction 
of ‘originating context’ has no easily definable limit to its outward extension.19 
And in the second, the many conceivable reception-situations from the creation 
of the work right down to the present day mean a similarly open-ended 
proliferation of potentially determining ‘contexts’.  
As is understandable for an activity that claims to say historical things 
about its objects, art history has traditionally appealed to a version of originating 
context to establish work identity, and this in practice tends to reduce to a 
construction of the way the original makers or users of the work would have 
seen or used the work. Many are happy to use ‘intention’ as a shorthand for this. 
But intention, as will be addressed further below, is an even more controversial 
term in art history than context. Whether acknowledging an embrace of 
intention or not, art historians have thus carefully worked up a set of 
vocabularies or rhetorical moves that allow them to circumvent this problem, in 
what I call the appeal to an attenuated form of intention. Something very like 
originating context or intentionality is regularly appealed to in order fix work 
identity, but in a way that does not commit the writer to a belief in recoverable 
or conscious mental states determining the meaning of the work; talk of 
‘intention’ is replaced by that of the posited ‘purposefulness’ that has constituted 
the ‘forward-leaning look’ of the object, of ‘networks of forms of likeness’ for the 
maker or ‘forms of likeness that things have in a particular form of life’, of the 
vision, gaze, or not necessarily conscious experience of the maker, or even 
simply implied by the language of conscious artistic agency through which the 
interpretation is narrated.20 
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The unavoidability of some minimal notion of intention at this grounding 
level is demonstrated as clearly as anywhere in James Elkins’ book on ‘the 
origins of modern pictorial complexity’, from which my opening examples were 
drawn. Elkins does not discuss or appeal directly to intention in deciding the 
cases of ambiguity, but in every instance the decision about what the picture is 
‘of’ reduces to how its maker would have seen it, so that distinctions are drawn 
between (proper intentionally grounded) ‘seeing in’ and (merely viewer 
generated) ‘reading in’, with the latter described as ‘projecting’ or 
‘hallucinating’.21 To put the point another way: how many art history books, 
however radical in rhetoric, have ever treated their subject matter as a series of 
origin-less found objects, and thus discussed works of art without any reference 
to the usually attributed creator and date of creation?22 
 
2. The appeal to intention 
An important aspect of the claim that there is standardly an appeal to an 
attenuated form of intention to establish the identity of the work – to 
purposefulness, or vision, or gaze, or not fully conscious intentionality – is 
brought into focus by the case of modernist criticism. For while some, such as 
Harrison and Michael Fried, have stressed the importance of artistic intention, 
they have at the same time maintained that close inspection of the works in 
question is the privileged route to its discovery. And notoriously, other 
prominent writers on modernist art – including Clement Greenberg and Roger 
Fry – have allied their commitment to close looking with a more direct insistence 
that intention, at least at the conscious level found in artists’ own statements 
about their work, is irrelevant to a proper understanding of the art in question.23 
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‘Formalists’, as W.J.T. Mitchell has put it, ‘think that meaning will take care of 
itself if we “subtract” extrinsic intention and let the language of the text work on 
us.’24 
Nonetheless, as Mitchell’s reference to ‘extrinsic’ intention implies, 
strategies like the formalist one that privilege the experience had in the face of 
the work leave open the possibility that meaning found in this way can be 
classed as a truer kind of (‘intrinsic’) intention. Amongst other places, the point 
is put especially directly in Stanley Cavell’s insistence that the work alone should 
tell a properly capable observer everything they need about intention, and so 
that ‘if we have earned the right to question it [about intention], the object will 
answer; otherwise not’.25 Whether the writer is Fry or Fried, then, this allows for 
an appeal to intention in order to establish the proper identity of the work, but 
with such intention found primarily ‘in’ the work through the critic’s own ‘close’ 
inspection. The ‘best possible’ interpretation of the work is taken over and above 
the conscious statements of the artist, and is then narrated in a manner (with the 
artist as active sentence-subject) that presents the thought as well as the action 
described by the critic as the artist’s own.26 Even where the relevance of 
intention is explicitly denied, the critic can nonetheless present the meaning they 
have discovered ‘in’ the work in strong terms of individual artistic agency. 
The tactic is exemplified in Rosalind Krauss’ essay ‘The Latin Class’, on Cy 
Twombly.27 There we hear Krauss’ arguments about Twombly’s practice 
repeatedly narrated as if they indicate Twombly’s intent, or in Krauss’ words are 
‘crucial to getting Twombly’s tone’.28 It is claimed, for example, that ‘he drew his 
own conclusions about the import of Abstract Expressionist gesture’; that 
‘Twombly took up graffiti as a way of interpreting the meaning of action 
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painting’s mark’; that the connection with Jackson Pollock’s work is ‘a way of 
declaring how Pollock’s work should be read, at least in Twombly’s eyes’; that ‘he 
cannot write "Virgil" on a painting and mean it straight’; and even of an 
interpretation contrary to Krauss’ own that ‘It is this reading Twombly seems to 
protest with every means at his disposal’.29 Then, revealing that Twombly’s own 
written and spoken words seem to contradict her interpretation, Krauss turns to 
an apparently anti-intentionalist stance:  
 
Do we care? To what degree do we have to respect Twombly’s self-assessment…To what 
degree is it our responsibility to make an independent reading of an artist’s work, 
acknowledging that while an artist may be a good interpreter of his or her own 
production, it does not follow that he or she will be its best one? No more than the 
analysand is the best reader of his or her dreams, motives, associations. To the contrary: 
The analysand is often the worst.30 
 
What this hints at, while needing further elaboration, is the way that 
those advocates of modernist painting who are most apparently ‘for’ or ‘against’ 
intention, when arguing for the rightness of their own interpretation in practice 
end up working according to the same basic principle. That is, the principle of 
the appeal to an attenuated form of intention – discovered primarily through 
close visual inspection – in order to disambiguate the work. 
A way into the issue is offered by recent debates over intention and affect 
in the work of Henri Matisse, in particular as staged in a 2013 book by Todd 
Cronan, Against Affective Formalism.31 There Cronan takes aim at those he 
describes as ‘affective formalists’ among recent writers on Matisse in particular: 
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Gilles Deleuze, Yve-Alain Bois, Rosalind Krauss, J.M. Bernstein, Alastair Wright, 
Éric Alliez, and Jean-Claude Bonne. This writing, for Cronan, is characterised 
throughout by the view that the artist developed a ‘surefire “system” to produce 
violent sensations in the beholder’s body’, his works being ‘affective “machines”’ 
that directly transfer expressive content through their formal structure, thus 
obviating any kind of representational mediation.32 Instead, Cronan argues 
 
Matisse’s work suggests something other than fantasies of expressive communion or 
affective transfer. Contrary to what Matisse sometimes said about the transparency of 
expression or the immediacy of affect…his works reflect on the problems of 
representing oneself to another, of how it is that a set of marks on a canvas or a sheet of 
paper can be understood or misunderstood, felt or rejected, by a beholder or even by 
oneself. Matisse came to feel that any work that did not open itself up to the possibility 
of failing to mean to another was a work that failed to mean at all…It is the discovery of 
the limits of and potentials for representation that is the primary content of his 
oeuvre’.33 
 
Despite Matisse’s nods to affect, Cronan concludes, his work ‘is better seen as a 
profound reflection on the limits and powers of expression as a mode of 
understanding’. His work reveals ‘that to express oneself to another requires an 
acknowledgement of the other’s difference; this difference both threatens 
isolation and makes every connection like an unrepeatable gift.’ To refuse this 
gift or to take it for granted – in the latter case to seek direct transmission of 
affects – ‘would involve a denial of the other and of oneself’.34 
 Foundational in this kind of thought about Matisse, as Cronan at one point 
notes, is the writing of Yve-Alain Bois. In the work that forms the crux of his 
 11 
reading of Matisse’s painting as ‘blinding’, Bois focuses in particular on the years 
between 1906 and 1911 in which Matisse ‘conclusively put in place’ his ‘system’, 
and in doing so definitively rejected the traditional conceptions of the decorative 
favoured by certain non-progressive contemporaries.35 As his patron’s support 
waned in the face of Matisse’s radicalism, Bois writes, Matisse ‘took a huge 
gamble’, and ‘as if he had nothing to lose’ carried ‘to the extreme’ the ‘decorative 
profusion that had characterized many of his works from the previous years’.36 
Bois writes as follows of the two canvases that resulted (Fig. 3): 
 
Both Seville Still Life and Spanish Still Life are difficult to behold – that is, the viewer 
cannot gaze at their pullulating arabesques and color flashes for very long. As had 
already happened in Le Bonheur de vivre, but now much more so, these paintings appear 
to spin before the eye; nothing there ever seems to come to rest. Flowers, fruits, and 
pots pop up like bubbles that dissolve into their busy, swirling background as quickly as 
one manages to isolate them. The centrality of the figure is dismantled: the viewer feels 
compelled to look at everything at once, at the whole visual field, but at the same time 
feels forced to rely on peripheral vision to do so, at the expense of control over that very 
field.37 
 
Following on from the earlier development of ‘Matisse’s system’, this is what 
Bois calls Matisse’s ‘aesthetic of blinding’.38 It operates just as much, Bois writes, 
in an apparently simpler and calmer canvas such as Music, for there the sheer 
size of the picture – ‘one hundred-plus feet of saturated colour’ – combines with 
the even distribution of figures to create an ‘aporia of perception’.39 The pull of 
the background colour leaves one unable to contemplate a single musician, while 
converse attention to the picture as a whole is disrupted by the ‘optical 
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vibrations’ of the vermillion forms against the blue-and-green ground. Bois bases 
his analyses on the notion that figure and ground are ‘the very opposition on 
which human vision is based’, and that the way they annul each other in 
Matisse’s work – are ‘deliberately destabilized’ – means that ‘our vision ends up 
blurred, blinded by excess’.40 This figure/ground aspect is not just blinding, but 
also hypnotising, ‘based on a pendulum in our perception that makes us switch 
from the whole visual field at once, an oscillation that defines the very invention 
of Matisse’s concept of the “decorative”’.41 To give just one more of Bois’ analyses 
(Fig. 4):  
 
…in Interior with Eggplants…everything cooperates in leading us astray: the pulsating 
repetition of the flower motif that invades floor and walls and blurs their demarcation; 
the reflection in the mirror that coloristically matches the landscape outside the window 
and confuses levels of reality; the syncopated rhythm and different scales of the 
ornamental fabrics; the gestures of the two sculptures (one on the table, the other on the 
mantelpiece) that rhyme with the arabesques of the folding screen. The three eggplants 
that give the painting its title are right in the middle of the canvas, but Matisse has 
blinded us to them and it is only through a conscious effort that we manage, only 
fleetingly, to locate them.42 
 
So what is so wrong with this kind of writing? Cronan is committed to a view of 
intentionality roughly derived from that of Walter Benn Michaels and Stephen 
Knapp’s 1982 paper ‘Against Theory’, and re-presented a number of times over 
the years.43 According to this view, in order for us to interpret their meaning, 
works of art must be recognised as products of intention (which once discovered 
simply is their meaning). Refusing intention forces one to treat works as if they 
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were objects like any other in the world rather than works of art made by a 
person or persons in a time and place, and leaves one able to appeal only to the 
subjective experience of the empirical viewer, which given its inherently 
personal nature is not something about which we can debate. At a number of 
points in his book Cronan makes clear that he equates the appeal to ‘affect’ with 
exactly this kind of experience of the empirical viewer.44 It is something that is 
within someone and simply a ‘fact’, that no one can reasonably confirm or deny – 
no one can tell you that you have failed to experience yourself correctly – and 
thus something no one can argue about. This investment of the picture-as-object 
alone with agency naturally obviates what the artist themselves did, thought, and 
felt, and has as a result, for Cronan, nothing at all to do with art and its 
interpretation. 
Where Knapp and Michaels were reticent, Cronan offers a detailed and 
highly sophisticated view of intention, pointing out that those who refuse it tend 
to base their critique on an impossibly simplistic construct of what intent might 
involve.45 Perhaps most significantly given the standard complaints about 
intention, Cronan claims his account to be ‘antipsychological’ in a sense, for it is 
‘not an appeal to artistic psychology, to figuring out what is going on inside an 
artist’s head or heart’.46 Intention thus has nothing to do with a conscious mental 
plan in the mind that precedes the work – probably the most prevalent 
misrepresentation – nor is to be equated with the artist’s conscious or 
articulated sense of the work’s meaning.47 Instead it is a mixture of conscious 
and unconscious aspects that is formed in and during the creation of the work. 
Intentions emerge ‘in and through the process of production’, and largely come 
to be known once they have been ‘externalized for a beholder’ (which can 
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include the artist as beholder of their picture). This beholder in turn can ‘come to 
know him- or herself in the encounter with the work’.48 
Analysis carried out on this basis is not a case of ‘finally or ultimately 
knowing’, of attaining a moment where ‘the intention is fully captured or 
recovered by the interpreter’.49 It is instead simply ‘to say that an artist meant 
something by his or her work, and that is what the art historian aims to 
understand by whatever means available’ – recovery of past meanings is ‘an 
ongoing challenge’ that ‘should not be forfeited on the grounds that one cannot 
have absolute certainty’. Its methodology is mixed, involving cautious usage of 
‘writings, statements, interviews, documents’, and ‘biography’. But the ‘primary 
evidence’ in the readings of Matisse ‘are the visual characteristics of his work. 
And the characteristics that are relevant to my account are the ones I see as 
intended by the artist’.50 
There are echoes of both Stanley Cavell and Richard Wollheim here, in the 
sense that intention is something that you can ultimately come to know through 
close inspection of the work itself, even in the most unlikely of cases. In 
Wollheim’s account, close in many respects to Cronan’s, the artist paints not just 
with the eyes, but for the eyes, at times acting as spectator of their own work, 
and imagining how a viewer of their work would respond.51 The effects of a 
work, in other words, are ones that the artist can be imagined to experience or 
intend themselves, as spectator of the work up until the moment it is done with. 
Thus Wollheim’s famous three hour sessions of close inspection of single works 
would yield up apparently highly unlikely results which could be safely taken as 
definitely intended properties of the work, dispensing with any caution about 
visual ambiguity or overdetermination in the viewer’s experience. Take his 
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account of the realisation that Manet’s paintings contained an internal spectator, 
where at the 1984 Manet exhibition ‘time and time again, I discovered that I was 
engaging in imaginative enactments of a kind that might be expected to follow in 
the wake of my explicitly locating an internal spectator. Yet I had done no such 
thing. That being so, I trusted my eyes had not deceived me, and that the 
repertoire that I was following with such conviction was one for which my 
perception of the painting had given me some warrant: some implicit warrant, 
that is.’52 
This take on intention places the texts of Bois and others like him in a 
very different light. Recall their quasi-objective claims about the perceptual 
effects that Matisse’s works have. If these were nothing more than ‘affect’ on 
Cronan’s terms, they would not be universalizable, but would instead have to be 
described as differing for each individual viewer. Think also that what Bois 
describes (or at least Cronan represents him describing) as ‘affects’, simply could 
not be the result of a context-less object working on the nervous system of the 
viewer: the way that the ‘thing’ doing the affecting is described by these writers – 
by detailed reference to Matisse’s biography and writings, and as the product of 
‘Matisse thought’, or the ‘Matisse system’ – makes it painfully clear that it has 
already been pre-constituted as ‘a Matisse’; an object disambiguated by the 
knowledge of its origins as a particular ‘work’ of art made by a particular artist in 
a cultural context, rather than just a found and context-less layer of oil and 
pigment. 
What is happening here is that the effects are being described as the 
inevitable ones of looking at a Matisse, when seen as the particular cultural 
object that it is, created in a particular artistic context by a particular maker who 
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would have seen it in a particular way. (Against the idea that affects are universal 
and inescapable, Bois and Wright note with evident disapproval that many have 
seen and still do see these works in ways that do not accord with their readings, 
while Alliez and Bonn conclude that the logic of affect leaves viewers open to 
revel in their own responses, however personal.53) The writers reject conscious 
and naïve constructs of intention. And in doing so they fall back on a mid way 
construct which they may or may not call ‘intention’ in theory, but which in 
practice leads them to work in a way that is importantly close to Cronan’s.54 Bois’ 
idea that the perceptual effects described are so fundamental is gained from a 
combination of biographical and written evidence from Matisse himself, and the 
overriding sense in front of the work that these are the right experiences to 
have.55 Implicit in that judgement, of course, is that those are the experiences 
Matisse would have had of the work. As Bois says elsewhere, ‘Matisse’s goal was 
not to represent the thing, but to represent the effect of the thing on him when 
he was painting it, and to create the same effect on the beholder’.56 
Some call it intentionality and others anti-intentionality, then. But the 
tactic of depsychologized intention-as-hypothetical-construct, where a cautious 
approach is taken to biography and conscious statements, and the effects of the 
work are given priority, is in fact a shared feature of the writing of Cronan and 
Bois. Their disagreement – and whatever Cronan says about not being able to 
argue with Bois, he certainly does – is about the particular effects that the work 
has, the underlying intentions in the work that these reflect, and the way that 
meaning should be constructed out of them. In other words, how the work 
should be disambiguated – properly seen and experienced – based on how its 
originating context is best understood.  
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3. The use of context 
So much for intention.57 But what of the more general ideas of ‘context’ – 
whether original art historical or cultural context, or later contexts of reception – 
of which intention is only really one component? I said earlier that one lesson of 
indiscernibles was that no matter what the immediately visible look of the work, 
the bringing to bear of a new context would always allow the work to be 
redescribed. If the features are not directly visible, art critical language is well 
equipped to redescribe them in a metaphorical or analogical way, a process that 
has been explained by various writers as carried out by adopting a mode of 
(metaphorical) seeing-as (rather than seeing-in), by attention to non-visible 
likenesses (rather than visible ones), or by the application of artistic perception 
(as opposed to pictorial perception).58 What I want to show in this section is not 
what underlies ‘redescription’, however, but how this works in practice: the way 
that the introduction of a context can then allow the art writer to redescribe 
properties of the work in the service of a general description or interpretation, 
perhaps especially when the description is based on ‘close looking’.59  
An important side note to this is how such broadened contexts are 
subsequently recouped at the level of attenuated intention, as if the artist 
themselves would in some way have seen or experienced or ‘meant’ the work in 
the way that the redescription discovers. This is something like a rhetorical 
concertina effect, as the writing expands outwards to propose an increasingly 
inclusive set of contexts relative to which the work is to be described, then 
retracts back to imply that the description and meaning generated were all along 
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a function of the (far more secure) intention and origin that make the work of art 
what it really ‘is’.60 
 
The process at work here can be seen in a recent article on ‘The Power of 
Looking: Teaching Students the Value of Deceleration and Immersive Attention’, 
based on a lecture given at the Harvard Initiative for Learning and Teaching 
conference in 2013.61 As the subtitle suggests, the author, Jennifer Roberts, sets 
out to illustrate the value of focused attention to works of art, of slowing down, 
of ‘delay’. She approvingly quotes David Joselit’s suggestion that paintings are 
‘time batteries, deep reservoirs of experience’, and describes the great value her 
students have found in the exercise in which she sends them to look at a single 
painting for three hours while taking notes on it. To illustrate the point, she 
notes that she carried out the exercise on John Singleton Copley’s Boy with a 
Squirrel (Fig. 5) as part of her research on a recent book, and that ‘it took me a 
long time to see some of the key details that eventually became central to my 
interpretation and my published work on the painting’. 
The unusual clarity of the account, given its origins in a didactic setting, 
allows for the abstraction of a basic recipe for putting together an interpretation 
grounded in close looking. Roberts’s interpretation proceeds from picking out 
pictorial details like the fingers spanning the water glass, to giving information 
about Copley’s having produced the painting to send to England, to a higher level 
reading of the symbolising and allusion to questions of time and distance the 
described details involve, to an overall meaning of the painting as being ‘about 
its own patient passage through time and space’. The four general stages, which 
in practice can be carried out in different order, and with different stresses, often 
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such that one or other will only ever be implicitly dealt with, are: qualities; 
context; redescription; meaning. 
 
1) Qualities. Pick out a selection of qualities of the object that appear significant. 
1b) Purposefulness. Attribute some kind of purposefulness to them 
(treating them as the product of an agent acting, from which we can make 
inferences about that action). 
2) Context. Bring in, allude to, or have already implicitly established, a context 
(which can be anything from the kinds of socio-historical background most often 
associated with the word, to an abstract concept, a methodology, a later context 
of reception, or a general proposition about meaning in artworks of a particular 
type). 
3) Redescription. Redescribe the qualities originally picked out in terms relevant 
to the context (through metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and association to 
other works or things). 
4) Meaning. Narrate the redescribed qualities to give a ‘meaning’ of the work. 
 
This works in the example as follows: 
 
1) Qualities are picked out. 
- After nine minutes it was noticed ‘that the shape of the boy’s ear precisely 
echoes that of the ruff along the squirrel’s belly’. 
- After 21 minutes Roberts ‘registered the fact that the fingers holding the chain 
exactly span the diameter of the water glass beneath them’. 
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- After 45 minutes she ‘realized that the seemingly random folds and wrinkles in 
the background curtain are actually perfect copies of the shapes of the boy’s ear 
and eye’. 
1b) Purposefulness is attributed to the qualities. 
- Along with the echo of boy’s ear and squirrel’s belly it was noticed that 
‘Copley was making some kind of connection between the animal and the 
human body and the sensory capacities of each’. 
- The echo of background curtain and boy’s ear and eye are ‘as if Copley 
had imagined those sensory organs distributing or imprinting themselves 
on the surface behind him’. 
(In both cases here note the artist as active sentence-subject: ‘Copley was 
making’; ‘as if Copley had imagined’.) 
 
2) A context is established, based on details of Copley’s slow, long-distance 
relationship with the London art world. 
- Copley was already successful in the United States but was keen to get feedback 
from the London art world. 
- He created and sent this picture to begin the correspondence. 
- It was around eleven months before a letter was received in reply, informing 
him of the reception, and future correspondence continued at a similar pace. 
 
3) The qualities picked out in the initial close looking are redescribed in terms 
relevant to the context. 
- The squirrel is a flying squirrel, as the belly indicates, ‘a species native to North 
America with obvious thematic resonances for the theme of travel and 
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movement’, while ‘squirrels in painting and literature were commonly 
understood to be emblems of diligence and patience’. 
- The glass of water and hand ‘evokes the passage of a sensory chain across a 
body of water and thereby presents in microcosm the plight or task of the 
painting itself’. 
- The profile format, ‘in the eighteenth century…was very strongly associated 
with persistence in time and space.’ Profiles were usually seen on coins, and ‘[i]n 
essence, a coin is a tool for transmitting value through space and time in the 
most stable possible way. Coins are technologies for spanning time and distance, 
and Copley borrows from these associations for a painting that attempts to do 
the same thing.’ 
 
4) The redescribed qualities are brought together to support a meaning. 
- ‘The painting is about its own patient passage through time and space… 
Copley’s painting, in other words, is an embodiment of the delays that it was 
created to endure.’ 
 
This is a clear illustration of the process whereby contexts are expanded 
outwards to enrich the reading of the work – from the moment of creation of the 
work, to Copley’s artistic context, to the London art world and transatlantic 
dialogue, and the reception of Copley’s work there – which is then secured as 
quasi-intentional. (In the more complex presentations that are usual in academic 
art historical writing, the process seen here may be carried out a number of 
times, as a series of loops are made that select qualities, explicate a context, 
redescribe the qualities, select new qualities, and so on.62) An opening suggestion 
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that details picked out were later crucial to the interpretation does briefly imply 
a view of ‘found’ details and ‘made’ interpretation, but Roberts’ text is 
predominantly couched in the language of recovery of historical meaning. While 
Roberts is cautious and subtle in her claims, the interpretation is naturally to be 
taken as a historically grounded one – the meanings, associations, and such like, 
are all also as if for Copley in the past, such that he may well at some level have 
seen or experienced the painting as, post interpretation, we now should. 
 
To some formalist or modernist critics the analysis in question might be rejected 
as a classic example of sociohistorical or culturological contextual interpretation. 
Meaning, it might be claimed, is being made by drawing on a context brought 
from ‘outside’. But this would entirely miss the point that there is no question of 
secure visual analysis without some idea of a context of origin or reception that 
will decide what the work really is. In this sense we are always dealing with 
preferred forms of what might constitute a disambiguating context, rather than 
any neatly internal/external, text/context, situation. 
This can be seen in another, briefer, example, taken from a critic of exactly 
this kind of interpretation – who writes that ‘as important as these contextual 
analyses can be, in them the task of interpreting the meaning of the work itself 
often yields to accounting for its causes. The work of art is treated as a result of 
certain pressures, an effect of its context’s causing’.63 Dealing with Jackson 
Pollock, the writer, Michael Schreyach, follows a similar line to Cronan in 
resisting the reduction of meaning to either causal explanations (including 
explicit artistic statements) or the affective responses of an empirical viewer. 
Instead his argument for an ‘intentionalist position’ is more or less identical to 
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Cronan’s. He adds explicit nods to Wollheim and Charles Harrison, an 
acknowledgement of the ‘hypothetical’ nature of his construction of intention, 
and a by now familiar appeal to the perceptual effects of the work of art as the 
best way to get at intention. 
 
Putting Schreyach’s interpretation of Pollock’s Number 1, 1949 (Fig. 6) into the 
schema from above, the first stage proceeds as usual: 
 
1) Qualities are picked out, as a set of perceptual effects are described as 
qualities possessed by the work. 
- It is difficult for a viewer to select from the surface any single pictorial incident 
that seems to impinge upon attention more than any other. 
 - But with the gaze fixed at the centre, a relatively stable elliptical area appears, 
which counters the all-over quality of the surface 
1b) Purposefulness is established. 
- ‘This thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we 
interpret the modes of experience or consciousness Pollock wants to 
express.’ 
 
Something more interesting happens, however, at the stage of adding context, for 
the writing moves directly from initially picked out qualities to a higher-level 
redescription of those aspects of the work. What is easily missed here is what 
has already been set up by the lengthy earlier part of the essay, as well as a 
footnote to Michael Fried’s ‘Shape as Form’ essay. So that 
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2) the ‘context’ added by allusion is one of a particular view of modernist 
painting and the kind of interpretation proper to it, deriving primarily from 
Fried and to a lesser extent Michaels and others. It involves two propositions 
crucial to what follows: 
- One of the features of high modernist painting was its resistance to the literal 
shape of its material support, so that the painting operates as a work of art, 
rather than like any other object in the world.  
- The work of art – having successfully avoided reduction to mere object – is the 
product of an intention, and the dramatizing of its intentionality is one 
significant feature of modernist painting. 
 
3) The qualities of the work (the particular perceptual effects highlighted) are 
redescribed in accordance with the context. 
- ‘the internal framing of the ovoid provides a certain emergent structure to the 
image which restores to the painting a degree of pictorial cohesiveness that is 
more or less independent of both its perceived limits and the literal frame, as if 
the pictorial structure is now understood to be generated from the inside out, 
from the interior of the image to its frame, rather than the other way around, and 
creates a sense of the painting as a whole.’ 
- ‘the constitution of that totality – a structure that serves as a medium for 
expressive content, versus a merely literal shape – is to be understood itself as 
emergent from the figurative depth of the field, not given beforehand’ 
- ‘The total visual field then, far from being an accumulation of marks that are 
taken as traces or indexes of his movements or actions above the canvas, can be 
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understood to be expressive of something like the subject’s emergence to the 
world, and of the freedom of his or her creative intentionality.’ 
4) A meaning is provided. 
-  ‘On this account, Number 1, 1949 conveys something about the conditions of 
experience through which a reflective subject might grasp the significance of her 
embodied modes of intentionality – her own deep animating intentions.’ 
 
In both these cases, whether description is through openly sociohistorical 
interpretation or adopts an avowedly modernist and anti-contextual stance, the 
same basic structure is in operation. A small set of qualities are picked out and 
redescribed at a new level in accordance with a set of contexts, and attenuated 
intentionality is retrospectively recovered to secure the reading as a historical 
one. In the latter example the particular construction of what modernism as an 
artistic enterprise involved itself comes to function as a context.64  
 
4. Making modernists 
Where does this all leave things? The account I have offered is based on two 
main points: 
1) Intention of an attenuated kind is standardly appealed to in order to establish 
what a work is, and so the way it should be seen. 
2) ‘Close looking’ in practice operates via ‘redescription’ –picking out qualities 
and redescribing them in terms of a context – and this tends to be folded back 
into the appeal to an attenuated form of intention. (Rather than standing for a 
disavowal of context, in this case, modernism can itself function as such a 
context.) 
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In closing, I would like to highlight something further that is brought into focus 
by the account of close looking offered here. Applying the analysis and the two 
points above to writing on modernism adds up to a further point:  
3) That a governing context brought to bear, such as modernism, functions in art 
writing to attribute a generalised form of intentionality to the set of artists to 
which it is said to be relevant. 
 
It is uncontroversial to say that the greatest modernist critics have been those 
with the most convincing and passionately defended constructions of what 
‘modernism’ as a whole involves – a fact declared by the modernism-centred 
rather than work- or artist-specific nature of some of the most violent debates 
between them: ‘A View of Modernism’; ‘Using Language to do Business as Usual’; 
‘Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art’; ‘How Modernism Works’. Often it has been 
pointed out, too, that this results in ‘modernism’ for these writers becoming a 
separate volitional entity with its own intentional force.65 
What is less clear, though, is the extent to which constructions of 
modernism are then mobilised as a context, and used to construct ideas of 
artistic purposefulness. This is no more than the necessary consequence of 
embracing the circularity that results from the pattern of intention-inference in 
play. The works that the understanding, committed, and true to their own 
response critic singles out are those works that compel conviction.66 In turn, the 
critic knows that, due to the ‘internal’ take on intention, what they feel is there in 
the work is all they need to decide what was meant by it. (‘If we have earned the 
right to question it, the object itself will answer; otherwise not’.) The works are 
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thus said to compel conviction because they are intentionally made to participate 
in the (modernist) tradition of artmaking favoured by the critic: they are 
described as if the artist intended their work to engage (in whatever way the 
critic deems suitable) with those works of the recent past that also (for the critic) 
compelled conviction. Close looking will of course play its part at this stage. But 
everything significant about the work’s identity and the kind of attention that 
should govern its description has already been decided by the certainty that the 
artist set out to work in the given modernist tradition. Here is Rosalind Krauss 
on one of those artists she sees as the ‘Knights of the Medium’ providing the 
necessary continuation of modernism into the present day: ‘‘I think what I’m 
more interested in is stumbling on work that for one reason or another I 
recognise as genuine and then I try to understand where it comes from and what 
it is that secures the notion of it as authentic…I believed that the work of the 
Irish artist James Coleman is the real thing when I saw it. Outraged people 
weren’t saying ‘fake and phoney’, but the critical arguments for the work were 
themselves, I felt, fake and phoney. The defence of the work was made on 
grounds that I thought were irrelevant to the interest of the work. The grounds 
were national identity, the construction of identity, all this constructionalist stuff, 
which I thought had nothing to do with the work. What had to do with the work 
was the fact that he had essentially invented a medium. He invented a medium as 
the technical support for the work.’67 
In regard to contemporary art, this means that impressively close 
attention to works leads to Fried and Krauss defending their own narratives of 
the continuation of modernism by their own sets of artists: the ‘dialectically 
transformed…high modernist ideal of “presentness,”’ in the work of Anri Sala, 
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Charles Ray, Joseph Marioni, and Douglas Gordon;68 or the reconstitution of 
modernism’s self-reflexive medium-based practice and its autonomy via the idea 
of ‘technical support’, with Ed Ruscha, William Kentridge, Sophie Calle, Harun 
Farocki, Christian Marclay, and James Coleman cast as ‘those very few artists 
who have had the courage to resist the aneurystic purge of the visual, a purge 
meant to bury the practice of specific mediums under the opprobrium of a 
mindless moralizing against the grounds of art itself’.69 
In regard to high modernism, the closest most careful attention to those 
still canonical works yields the figure we commonsensically think of as one artist 
setting out to make aesthetic equivalents for their experience, pursuing the logic 
of reduction to the essence of the specific medium, shocking the contemporary 
viewer into blindness and schizophrenia, struggling with the possibility of 
representing oneself to another, and on. Found through close looking, the 
individual agents-as-modernist-artists designated under each proper name 
(‘Matisse’) are made to proliferate in step with that of modernisms, while within 
each individual writer’s modernism we find a likeness in the agency and the 
work of all included figures, as their deep goals and the qualities of their work 
alike are redescribed at the higher level of participation in this particular 
narrative of modernism’s history.  
For this reason, Harrison’s suggestion that the self-critical artist deserving 
of the name tests for their work’s capacity to arbitrate its own description gets 
things the wrong way round. In practice, the works that compel conviction are 
found by the critic and carefully redescribed, making their own kind of 
modernists out of the people who created them. 
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